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Abstract
Although the crisis of the Welfare State has been evoked for quite a long time,
ﬁgures show that such a phenomenon has arisen only recently. Furthermore, it is
not a common feature in all developed countries. This paper aims at explaining
these two empirical facts. We use an overlapping generations model in which agents
decide to educate themselves or not endogenously. Furthermore, at each date, the
working population vote on the size of a redistributive policy. Firstly, we show that
the share of the educated population can be the engine of the crisis of the Welfare
State. Moreover, our paper emphasizes that the expectations of agents about the
size of redistributive policies, can explain the timing diﬀerential in the crisis of the
Welfare State between developed countries.
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1 Introduction
Since the end of the secondWorldWar, the role of governments has dramatically expended.
Indeed, they set up an objective solidarity which mainly aims at insuring agents against
life risks, and at reducing wealth inequalities (Merrien 2007, Barr 2002). However, for
a few years, a growing literature consider that the Welfare State is in "crisis" or that
it will be soon. The Welfare State would suﬀer from a questionable eﬃciency, from a
legitimacy crisis, and from ﬁnancial diﬃculties (Rosanvallon 1992). Concerning the ﬁrst
point, the literature argues that the private sector provides a better alternative to public
expenditures because of the improvement of its eﬃciency (Bergh 2008). Moreover, the
size of transfers has a signiﬁcant distorsive impact on economic decisions. Secondly, the
opacity of the management of public funds would imply that citizens do not necessarily
consider any further expenditure as useful. Finally, the aging of the population, the
increase in the unemployment (notably in Europe), or the improvement of the quality
of health services have increased the burden of taxation. Although the "crisis" of the
Welfare State is detailed in a fair number of studies, empirical data do not conﬁrm their
assertions. Indeed, the changes in the size and in the structure of the Welfare State
seem to be incremental (Bergh 2008). However, it is possible to distinguish some trends
about the size of the public sector in developed countries1 (see ﬁgure 1). More speciﬁcally,
countries can be classiﬁed in two groups. In the ﬁrst one, the ﬁscal burden has increased or
is remained stable. France, Germany, the United-Kingdom and the United-States among
others, belong to this group. In the second one, the ﬁscal burden has decreased for a few
years. Canada and the Netherlands describe such a trend. Consequently, even if the term
"crisis" does not seem to be the most appropriate to describe the situation, it seems that
some countries have questioned the size of their Welfare State. Let us now consider the
case of the European Union. In ﬁgure 2, it is shown that the size of the public sector
has begun to decrease for a few years. Consequently, in average, countries have begun to
question the size of their government.
In this paper we propose a model which is compatible with the previous facts. We
assume that tax revenue is only used to redistribute resources between socio-economic
groups. Our main argument is that the evolution of the political support for redistribution
can explain the dynamics of the Welfare State. Moreover, in our model, the period from
which the size of public spending decreases depends on the expectations of agents. This
1In this paper the size of the public sector is represented by the share of the tax revenue in the GDP.
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Figure 1: Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP for some developed countries. Source:
OECD.
can explain the timing diﬀerential in the crisis of the Welfare State between near countries.
Some papers have previously studied the endogenous determination of the size of public
spending (identiﬁed with the expenditures of redistribution) using political equilibrium
models (Meltzer and Richard 1981, Persson and Tabellini 2000). In these static models,
agents supply their labor endogenously, given their productivity endowment and given
the size of public transfers. Moreover, it is assumed that agents vote on the size of public
spending knowing their distorsive impact on labor supply. Public transfers are ﬁnanced
through a tax rate on wages, and are used to ﬁnance a ﬂat beneﬁt. The equilibrium tax
rate is determined by the agent endowed with the median wage. Belletini and Ceroni
(2007) use the same kind of model, but they assume (i) an exogenous labor supply, and
(ii) that agents can face a liquidity constraint. In that case, the median voter is not
necessarily the agent endowed with the median wage. Compared to these models, we
add a dynamic environment. Furthermore, as in Belletini and Ceroni (2007), we do not
consider the case of an endogenous labor supply to keep the model tractable.
Some other papers have studied the linkages between growth and redistribution (Alesina
and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994). In these second kind of papers, the tax rate
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Figure 2: Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP in the European Union (19 countries)
between 1990 and 2007. Source: OECD. The line is get using the command Smoothing-
Spline plot in S-Plus.
4
bears on the return of savings. Consequently, the ﬁscal system has a distorsive impact
on capital accumulation. These transfers are used to ﬁnance ﬂat beneﬁts for Persson and
Tabellini (1994), and to ﬁnance Government spending on productive activities for Alesina
and Rodrik (1994). The common feature of these two papers is to show that more inequal-
ities lead to a higher demand for redistribution, which increases the tax rate on capital
accumulation. It implies that the growth rate of the economy decreases. These models
can be considered as the ﬁrst models which include both a dynamic environment and a
demand for redistribution. However, in their models, the structure of the population is
constant over time and they only consider the dynamics of the income distribution. Per-
otti (1993) incorporates an endogenous determination of the structure of the population
à la Galor and Zeira (1993), into a model in which the size of the social security system
is endogenously determined. However, he does not study the dynamics of the structure
of the population2.
Our paper completes this literature on two signiﬁcant points. (1) These papers use
static models. It implies that all changes in the size of the Welfare State come from
modiﬁcations of some relevant parameters such as wage inequalities. Consequently, their
models cannot provide an explanation of the dynamics of the size of Government. (2)
Because the structure of the population is exogenous, these models do not study the impact
of the increase in the share of the educated population on the demand for redistribution.
However, the dynamics of modern economies also has an impact on the structure of the
population, which changes the political support for intra-generational transfers.
Acemoglu (2002) reported two stylized facts concerning the evolution of the structure
of the population. (1) There has been a large increase in the supply of skills in the US
economy over the past sixty years. (2) There has been an increase in the relative return
(the wage diﬀerential) of education. Firstly, an increase in the skill premium has a positive
impact on the share of the educated population. Moreover, following an increase in the
share of the educated population, the stock of knowledge in the economy raises, which
increases the marginal productivity of skilled agents more than that of unskilled agents.
We explore these two causalities.
In this paper, we assume an overlapping generations model in which agents live for
two periods. In the ﬁrst period of their life, agents decide to educate themselves or not,
while in the second one agents work and supply one unit of labor inelastically. At each
2Only Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2002) consider a vote on public spending and an endogenous structure
of the population in a cultural transmission model.
5
period t, the working population vote on the size of the Welfare State which can take
two values to simplify the model: a high and a low tax rate. Tax revenue is redistributed
through ﬂat beneﬁts to workers. It implies that educated agents (who receive high wages)
vote for the low tax rate, while uneducated agents (who receive low wages) vote for the
high tax rate. As long as uneducated (educated) agents have the majority, the high (low)
tax rate is chosen. Consequently, the structure of the population determines the size of
the Welfare State in our model. Our accumulation variable is knowledge capital. The
share of the educated population has a positive impact on the stock of knowledge. Ceteris
paribus, a higher knowledge capital level has a positive impact on the share of the educated
population because of the increase in the wage diﬀerential between the educated and the
uneducated population. Conversely, the higher the tax rate (redistribution) is, the less
agents decide to educate themselves. Finally, as the tax rate of period t has an impact on
the educational choices of agents born at period t−1, there can be indeterminacy. Indeed,
for a reasonably high value of the wage diﬀerential3, if agents expect a low tax rate, then
only a few of them decide to remain uneducated, and the low tax rate will actually be
chosen. Conversely, if agents expect that the high tax rate will be chosen, then only a few
of them decide to educate themselves, and the high tax rate is actually chosen.
This theoretical structure enables us to distinguish four relevant scenarii about the
dynamics of the Welfare State. The ﬁrst one is the following. Assuming that the initial
wage diﬀerential is low, then at the ﬁrst period, only a few agents decide to educate
themselves and the majority of people (uneducated agents) vote for high vertical transfers.
Then, because of the knowledge accumulation, the wage diﬀerential increases (Acemoglu
2002) and more agents decide to educate themselves. However, the educational decision
also depends on the size of vertical transfers. Consequently, for a reasonably high value
of the wage diﬀerential, if agents expect high vertical transfers, most of them remain
uneducated, and actually, uneducated agents keep the majority. But if agents expect
small vertical transfers, then most of them decide to educate themselves and educated
agents actually get the majority, and they vote for a small Welfare State. Finally, once
the wage diﬀerential is very high, whatever the size of vertical transfers, the share of
the educated population is so high that agents know that a small Welfare State will be
chosen in the next period. This scenario could describe the empirical evidence which
we mentioned above. Indeed, in a ﬁrst time the size of the Welfare Sate is signiﬁcant
because of a political support in favor of vertical redistribution. Then, the increase in
3We deﬁne more precisely in the model what the term "reasonnably high" means.
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the share of the educated population decreases the demand for vertical redistribution.
Consequently, agents vote for smaller public spending. In the second scenario, the cost
of education is so high that the economy reaches the low steady state before educated
agents get the majority. Then, in the long run, the high tax rate is chosen, and no crisis
of the Welfare State takes place. In the third scenario, we show that an economy uses a
high tax rate as long as agents expect that the same tax rate will be chosen at the next
period. However, once agents expect that the Welfare State will be less generous, then
a larger share of population decides to educate itself and the low tax rate is chosen at
steady state. Finally, in the fourth scenario, we show that there can appear cycles in the
size of the Welfare State. It means that an economy can switch from high public spending
to smaller one, according to the beliefs of agents.
This model allows us to study the dynamics of the Welfare State and to emphasize
some properties related to indeterminacy. Moreover, our model suggests that the evolution
of the Welfare State, and notably the "crisis of the Welfare State", is the result of new
political pressures because of the endogenous dynamics of the structure of the population.
To our knowledge, the literature on the welfare state has still not considered this problem
previously.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model.
In section 3, we study the equilibrium and the dynamics of the economy. Section 4
provides some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We assume an overlapping generations model in which agents live for two periods4. During
their ﬁrst period of life, agents decide to educate themselves or not. It is a binary choice.
If an agent decides not to educate himself, then he spends the time of his ﬁrst period
of life on leisure5. The utility level of leisure is normalized to 0. Conversely, if an agent
decides to educate himself, then he has to bear a psychological cost related to the learning
process. In this paper, we assume that it represents the time which cannot be spent for
leisure. When an agent is born, he is randomly endowed with an educational cost (θ).
This cost reduces the utility level of agents who decide to educate themselves (−v(θ)).
4The size of generations does not matter in our model because there are no inter-generational transfers.
Consequently, the size of each generation is assumed to be constant over time, and is denoted by N .
5The length of each period is normalized to 1. We assume that education only has a leisure cost.
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θ necessarily belongs to the interval Ωθ = [θ, θ¯]. f(θ) and F (θ) denote the density
function and the cumulative distribution function of θ respectively. They are such that
f(θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ Ωθ, F (θ) = 0 and F (θ¯) = 1. f(θ) also denotes the fraction of the
population endowed with a cost θ.
We make the following assumption concerning the function v(θ):
Assumption 1: v(θ¯) > 0, v(θ) is of class C1 and v′(θ) > 0, ∀θ ∈ Ωθ.
The ﬁrst part of this assumption only means that there exists a fraction of the pop-
ulation for whom the time spent on education is a cost. Otherwise, every agent would
choose to be educated. It also implies that our model does not exclude the case in which
education provides more utility than leisure for a part of the population. For these people,
education is a way to blossom out. It is the case iﬀ6 v(θ) < 0.
The last part of this assumption implies that a longer time spent on the learning pro-
cess reduces leisure time, and thus the utility level.
During their second period of life, every agent works and supplies one unit of labor
inelastically. At period t, the wage level of an educated agent is denoted by wet , while
that of an uneducated agent is denoted by wut . At each period t, each worker pays a
proportional tax (τt) on his wage to ﬁnance the Welfare State. The Government uses this
ﬁscal revenue to ﬁnance ﬂat transfers (bt). All agents beneﬁt from these transfers.
Moreover, we assume that there only exists one good in the economy which is used as
a numeraire.
2.1 Consumers
At period t, the budget constraint of an agent born at period t− 1 can be written:
W it = w
i
t(1− τt) + bt (1)
with i ∈ {e, u}. At period t− 1, an agent expects the wealth which he will receive when
he works. The expectation bears on the wage level (wi,at ) and on the size of the welfare
state (τat , bat ). Indeed, our model includes a dynamics of wages, and at each period, the
6In this paper "iﬀ" means "if and only if".
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size of the welfare state is endogenously chosen by the population.
Then, at period t− 1 we have:
W i,at = w
i,a
t (1− τat ) + bat (2)
Each agent is assumed to consume his wealth when he works. The utility level of an agent
born at period t− 1 can be written7:
U it = −(1− I)v(θ) + ln
(
W it
)
(3)
with I = 0 if an agent decides to educate himself, and I = 1 if he decides to remain
uneducated. At period t− 1 an agent decides to educate himself iﬀ: Uu,at < U e,at . This is
equivalent to:
ln
(
W e,at
W u,at
)
> v(θ) (4)
The use of the log-utility function implies that educational choices depend on the
wealth inequality ratio. An increase in this ratio corresponds to an increase in the oppor-
tunity cost of remaining uneducated.
Equation (4) will enable us to deﬁne a threshold value θ˜t such that, given the ex-
pectation of τat , agents for whom θ is smaller than θ˜t decide to educate themselves, while
agents endowed with a θ higher than θ˜t decide to remain uneducated. Consequently, F (θ˜t)
denotes the share of the educated population.
2.2 Knowledge Capital
In our economy, the accumulation variable is knowledge capital. ht denotes the knowledge
capital, i.e. the available stock of knowledge at period t for each agent. In doing so, we
assume that agents (educated and uneducated) only diﬀer by their ability to transform
knowledge capital into productivity, i.e. educated and uneducated agents diﬀer by their
ability to transfrom the stock of knowledge into a useful information for the production
process. The dynamics of the knowledge capital is assumed to have the following form:
ht+1 = Ψ(ht, θ˜t) (5)
7We use this utility function because of the tractability of our model.
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with8 Ψ1() > 0 and Ψ2() > 0. It implies that the current stock of knowledge has a positive
impact on the future stock of knowledge9. Moreover, the share of the educated population
at period t has a positive impact on the knowledge capital of period t + 1 because these
people do research.
The timing of the model is the following. Agents decide at period t − 1 to educate
themselves or not. Education consists in the acquisition of methods to transform and to
improve the stock of knowledge into useful information for the production process. As
for uneducated agents, their ability level is not suﬃcient to use the stock of knowledge
eﬃciently. At period t, agents use the methods which they have acquired when they were
young, given the current knowledge capital level. Moreover, educated agents develop new
knowledge by research activities, which will only be available at period t + 1. It implies
that there need time before this new knowledge can be used.
The previous assumptions imply that when an agent is born at period t − 1, he ob-
serves the current knowledge capital ht−1 and the share of the educated population θ˜t−1.
Consequently, he rightly expects the value ht. His only problem concerns the expectation
of the size of the Welfare State of period t.
2.3 Firms
We assume that the technology of ﬁrms has the following form:
Yt = f(ht, L
e
t , L
u
t ) (6)
with fi() > 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. It means that the stock of knowledge and both kinds
of labor have a positive impact on the production level. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrms take the
available stock of knowledge of the current period (ht) as given. ht is a positive externality
for each ﬁrm. However, ﬁrms choose the quantity of labor which they decide to use in
the production process. We make two further assumptions about the properties of the
production function: fii() < 0, and fij() > 0 if i 6= j. These assumptions notably imply a
decreasing marginal productivity of both kinds of labor. Assuming a perfect competition
on the ﬁnal good market and on the inputs markets, we have:
wet = f2(ht, L
e
t , L
u
t ) > 0 (7)
8gi denotes the derivative of g() with respect to its ith argument. gij denotes the derivative of gi with
respect to its jth argument.
9This is a standard assumption in the human capital literature.
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wut = f3(ht, L
e
t , L
u
t ) > 0 (8)
Finally, we make the following assumption about the wages of agents:
Assumption 2: wet > wut and
f21
f2
h >
f31
f3
h.
The ﬁrst part of this assumption implies that the wage level of educated agents is
higher than the wage level of uneducated agents. Thus, it is implicitly assumed that
the marginal productivity of unskilled workers is always ﬁnite, even if the quantity of
unskilled workers is small. Formally, it means that f2(h,N, 0) > f3(h,N, 0), ∀h, i.e. even
if all agents decide to educate themselves and if ﬁrms employ them, then the scarcity of
unskilled workers is not suﬃcient for their wage level to become higher than that of skilled
workers.
The second part of this assumption implies that the elasticity of the wage of skilled
agents with respect to knowledge capital is higher than the elasticity of the wage of
unskilled agents with respect to knowledge capital. Ceteris paribus, it means that the
increase in the stock of knowledge increases the wage inequality ratio we/wu (Acemoglu
2002). In the Acemoglu's paper (2002), the stock of knowledge is represented by a tech-
nological bias in favor of skilled workers.
2.4 Government
The Government budget constraint can be written:
Nτtw¯t = Nbt (9)
knowing that τt is endogenously determined at each period by a voting procedure. The
political equilibrium is detailed below.
3 The Dynamic Equilibrium
The dynamic equilibrium of this economy is the sequence {θt, τt, ht}t=0,..,+∞ which satisﬁes
the ﬁrst order conditions of ﬁrms ((7) and (8)), the educational choices of agents (4), and
the government budget constraint (9). This sequence is such that the input markets and
the output one are in equilibrium at each period. Thus, at each period we have:
Let = NF (θ˜t) (10)
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Lut = N(1− F (θ˜t)) (11)
Before studying the dynamics of the economy, we have to specify some properties of
wages in equilibrium.
3.1 Some Properties of Wages in Equilibrium
Given equations (10) and (11) the wages of educated and uneducated agents can be
written:
we(ht, θ˜t) = f2(ht, NF (θ˜t), N(1− F (θ˜t))) (12)
wu(ht, θ˜t) = f3(ht, NF (θ˜t), N(1− F (θ˜t))) (13)
Our assumptions on the production function imply that that the knowledge capital
(ht) has a positive impact on both we and wu (we1() > 0 and wu1 () > 010). However, it can
also be shown that the share of the educated population (F (θ˜t)) has a negative impact
on the wage level of educated agents (we2() < 0), and a positive one on the wages of une-
ducated agents (wu2 () > 0). This result comes from the decreasing marginal productivity
of labor.
The average wage of the economy can be written:
w¯t = F (θ˜t)w
e(ht, θ˜t) + (1− F (θ˜t))wu(ht, θ˜t) ≡ w¯(ht, θ˜t) (14)
The function w¯(ht, θ˜t) is such that w¯1() > 0. An increase in the knowledge capital
level has a positive impact on the average wage of the economy because of the increase in
the wages of educated and uneducated agents (with θ˜t constant). However, the share of
the educated population has an ambiguous impact on the average wage of the economy.
Diﬀerentiating equation (14) with respect to θ˜t we get:
∂w¯(ht, θ˜t)
∂θ˜t
= f(θ˜t)(w
e − wu)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A>0
+F (θ˜t)
∂we(ht, θ˜t)
∂θ˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
B<0
+(1− F (θ˜t))∂w
u(ht, θ˜t)
∂θ˜t︸ ︷︷ ︸
C>0
(15)
Elements A and C are both positive. Element A denotes the increase in the average
wage because of the increase in the share of the population having the higher wage level.
Element C denotes the increase in the wage level of uneducated agents because of the
bigger scarcity of this input. Finally, element B is negative because of the smaller scarcity
10Some simple calculations imply the result.
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of the educated population.
Using this preliminary analysis and equation (5), we can determine the share of the
educated population at each period. However, this choice depends on the result of the
voting procedure. Consequently, we ﬁrst study the determination of the share of the
educated population and the size of transfers from the Government. Finally, we consider
the dynamics of our economy, i.e. the sequence {θt, τt, ht}t=0,..,+∞.
3.2 The Share of the Educated Population
At period t − 1, every agent for whom the following inequality is (not) satisﬁed, decides
to educate himself (to remain uneducated):
ln
(
wet (1− τat ) + τat w¯t
wut (1− τat ) + τat w¯t
)
> v(θ) (16)
If it exists, the threshold value θ˜t is deﬁned by:
LHS(ht, θ˜t, τ
a
t ) ≡ ln
(
we(ht, θ˜t)(1− τat ) + τat w¯(ht, θ˜t)
wu(ht, θ˜t)(1− τat ) + τat w¯(ht, θ˜t)
)
= v(θ˜t) (17)
Lemma 1 (i) There exists a unique threshold value θ˜t such that θ < θ˜t < c¯ iﬀ LHS(ht, θ, τat ) >
v(θ) and LHS(ht, θ¯, τat ) < v(θ¯). (ii) This threshold is such that ∂θ˜t/∂τ
a
t < 0 and
∂θ˜t/∂ht > 0.
Proof : See the appendix of this paper.2
The ﬁrst element of the second part of lemma 2.1 shows that the size of the welfare
state has a negative impact on the share of the educated population. Indeed, because the
Government uses ﬂat transfers, they redistribute resources in favor of unskilled agents.
Consequently, an increase in the size of the Welfare State increases the opportunity cost
to educate oneself.
The second element of the part (ii) of the lemma shows that, for a given tax rate,
more agents decide to educate themselves if the knowledge capital level grows. Indeed, as
the knowledge capital raises, the wage inequality ratio (we/wu) increases because of the
larger marginal impact of the knowledge capital on the wages of educated agents than
on the wages of uneducated agents. Thus, the stock of knowledge increases the cost of
remaining uneducated, and more agents decide to educate themselves.
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Thanks to lemma 2.1, we can deﬁne a function θ˜() such that:
θ˜t = θ˜(ht, τ
a
t ) (18)
with θ˜1() > 0 and θ˜2() < 0.
3.3 The Political Equilibrium
In our economy, the government is only an institution which applies the decision taken
by the majority of the population. Among the working population, each group of agents
(educated and uneducated agents) is homogenous, thus all educated agents vote for the
same tax rate. As for uneducated agents, they vote for the same tax rate which is diﬀerent
from that of educated agents.
We assume that agents have to choose between two tax rates, τ¯ and τ , such that:
1 > τ¯ > τ > 0. Agents choose the tax rate which maximizes their wealth level. The
wealth level of an agent of type i can be written:
W it = w
i
t(1− τt) + τtw¯t (19)
The wealth of educated agents is a decreasing function of τt (assumption 2), while
the wealth of uneducated agents is an increasing function of τt. It implies that educated
agents vote for the lower tax rate τ , while uneducated agents vote for the higher tax rate τ¯ .
The political equilibrium is:
τt =
{
τ if F (θ˜t) > 1/2
τ¯ if F (θ˜t) < 1/2
We conclude from this analysis that there exists a threshold θˆt such that:
F (θˆt) = 1/2 (20)
As long as θ˜(ht, τat ) < θˆt, uneducated agents have the majority and the higher tax rate
(τ¯) is chosen. Conversely, once θ˜(ht, τat ) > θˆt, educated agents have the majority and the
lower tax rate τ is chosen. It implies that the expectations of agents concerning the tax
rate has an inﬂuence on the result of the vote. We deﬁne two threshold values for the
knowledge capital level: ha and hb, such that:
F (θ˜(ha, τ)) = 1/2 (21)
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and
F (θ˜(hb, τ¯)) = 1/2 (22)
Given that θ˜1() > 0 and that θ˜2() < 0, it is straightforward to show that hb > ha.
More speciﬁcally, diﬀerentiating equation (20) with respect to ht and τat we obtain:
dh
dτa
=
θ˜2(h, τ
a)
θ˜1(h, τa)
This equation means that the gap between ha and hb is all the more small as the
ratio between the marginal impact of the tax rate and the marginal impact of the stock
of knowledge is low. It means that the diﬀerential between the elasticity of the wages of
educated agents and the elasticity of the wages of uneducated agents with respect to the
stock of knowledge plays a signiﬁcant role. If this diﬀerential is high, then a small increase
in h provides a strong incentive to educate oneself. Consequently, if τ highly increases,
then it could be suﬃcient that h slightly increases for educated agents to get the majority.
Moreover, if the distance between ha and hb is small, then ha and hb take low (high)
values if a large fraction of the population has small (big) educational costs. It could
represent some other speciﬁcities of education which are not explicitly introduced in this
paper such as low monetary or cultural costs of education. It means that the educated
population gets the majority for low (high) values of the stock of knowledge.
Lemma 2 sums up the result of the vote for diﬀerent values of ht.
Lemma 2 If ht < ha, then no agent born at period t − 1 expects that τ can be adopted
and τt = τ¯ . For ht > hb, no agent expects the tax rate τ¯ can be adopted and thus τt = τ .
For ha < ht < hb, then we have self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
For ht < ha, the knowledge capital level is so small that agents know at period t − 1
that uneducated agents will have the majority at period t. Conversely, for ht > hb, the
knowledge capital level is so high that agents know at period t−1 that educated agents will
have the majority at period t. For the intermediate case (ha < ht < hb), if agents expect
that the low (high) tax rate will be chosen, then a large (small) share of the population
will educate itself and educated agents will (not) actually have the majority.
3.4 The Dynamics
The stock of knowledge of period t only depends on the share of the educated population
of period t − 1 and on the knowledge capital level ht−1 (equation (5)). Assuming that
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both can be observed without cost, agents know at period t−1 the value of the knowledge
capital of period t (ht). However, agents born at period t− 1 expect the result of the vote
of period t. This expectation has an impact on the share of the educated population at
period t, and thus, it has an impact on the knowledge capital of period t+ 1.
With equation (18), equation (5) can be rewritten:
ht+1 = Ψ(ht, θ˜(ht, τ
a
t )) ≡ Φ(ht, τat ) (23)
Using the properties of the function Ψ(), we have Φ1() > 0, i.e. a higher knowledge capital
level at period t has a direct positive impact on ht+1, and an indirect impact through the
share of the educated population of period t. Given Lemma 2.2, the dynamics of our
economy is described by:
ht+1 =
{
Φ(ht, τ¯) if ht < ha, or if ha < ht < hb and τat = τ¯
Φ(ht, τ) if ht > hb, or if ha < ht < hb and τat = τ
ht+1 is directly inﬂuenced by choices made at period t−1. Indeed, the share of the edu-
cated population of period t is determined at period t−1. However, this decision depends
on the expected tax rate of period t. Consequently, for low (high) values of knowledge
capital, agents know that the high (low) tax rate will be chosen at period t, and only a
few (most) people decide to educate themselves, which has a negative (positive) impact
on ht+1. For ha < ht < hb, if agents expect the tax rate τ¯ to be chosen at period t, then
only a few people decide to educate themselves, which implies that uneducated agents will
actually have the majority. At period t− 1, the expectation of a high tax rate at period
t has a negative impact on knowledge capital of period t+ 1.
Assumption 3: Φ11(ht, τat ) < 0 and Φ(0, τat ) ≥ 0.
The ﬁrst part of this assumption means that the function Φ() is a strictly concave
function of ht, which is a suﬃcient condition for the stability of the steady state. The
second part of this assumption implies that there exists a unique non-trivial steady state
for knowledge capital. Let us call a potential steady state, a steady state which should
be obtained if an economy kept the same tax rate τ at every period. h and h¯ denote
the steady state knowledge capital levels for the tax rates τ and τ¯ respectively. Given
assumption 4 and the properties of the functions Φ() and θ˜(), it is straightforward to show
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Figure 3: Potential steady states
that h and h¯ are stable, and that h > h¯. This result comes from the negative impact of
redistributive policies on the share of the educated population (see ﬁgure 3).
The dynamics of our economy is not trivial and we have to consider some cases ac-
cording to the respective positions of h¯, h, ha and hb11. We assume that the initial value
of knowledge capital h0 is given. The ﬁrst generation of agents born at period −1, decide
to educate themselves or not, expecting the values taken by h0 and by τa0 .
Case 1: h¯ > hb and h > hb
Figure 4 illustrates that case, which occurs as long as the gap between ha and hb is
not too high and if a large share of the population has small educational costs. The gap
between ha and hb is not too high if the knowledge capital has a dramatic impact on wage
inequalities. Moreover, educational costs are small if there are no monetary or cultural
barriers too signiﬁcant concerning the access to education.
In this ﬁrst case, the economy cannot converge towards the low steady state h¯, because
at that point, educated agents have the majority and the tax rate τ is chosen. A large
11We do not study all cases but only the ones which we consider to be the most relevant.
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Welfare State is only a temporary equilibrium. Let us consider that the initial value of
knowledge capital is small (h0 < ha). Figure 4 gives two examples of trajectories. h0 is
so small that agents born at period −1 know that the high tax rate will be chosen at
period 0. However, given the value h1, agents born at period 0 can have two kinds of
expectations. They can either expect that τ1 will be high and in that case the knowledge
capital follows the low trajectory; or they can expect that τ1 will be low and the knowledge
capital follows the high trajectory. In the long-run, whatever the initial value of h, the
economy will have a small Welfare State τ and knowledge capital will converge towards
h. Nevertheless, self-fulﬁlling prophecies can change the dynamics of the economy and
the date from which a small Welfare State is adopted12.
This case emphasizes that the size of the Government of near countries can follow
diﬀerent trajectories according to the beliefs of agents. Then, the "crisis of the Welfare
State" can appear at diﬀerent dates for countries having near initial characteristics.
Case 2: ha > h¯ and ha > h
Figure 5 illustrates that case, which occurs as long as the gap between ha and hb is not
12As in Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2002), the beliefs of agents matter to study the dynamics of our
economy. However, we assume that there is no coordination problem, i.e. agents share the same beliefs
about the future policy.
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too high13 and if the educational costs remain high for a signiﬁcant part of the population.
The low access to education implies that the wage diﬀerential has to be very high for a
large share of agents decide to educate themselves. Consequently, the economy reaches
the low steady state h¯ before the educated population gets the majority. A wide Welfare
State is chosen at all periods. This case could explain why some countries do not seem to
question the size of their Welfare State, and go on to use a high tax level (see ﬁgure 1).
In the two previous cases, the technology of the production process is such that the
knowledge capital has a signiﬁcant impact on the wage gap, and then on educational
choices. Let us remove this assumption. It implies that the redistributive policy has
henceforth a dramatic impact on educational choices. More formally, the distance be-
tween the thresholds ha and hb becomes high.
Case 3: h > hb > h¯ > ha
Figure 6 illustrates that case. It occurs as long as the distance between ha and hb is
13Let us recall that this is the case as long as the knowledge capital has a signiﬁcant impact on the
wage gap between educated and uneducated agents.
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signiﬁcant but not too high. Moreover, the value hb above which agents know that the
low tax rate will be chosen at the next period, is smaller than the potential steady state
of the knowledge capital. It means that the technology of the knowledge accumulation is
very eﬃcient.
In ﬁgure 6 we have represented the dynamics of an economy whose initial knowledge
capital (h0) is very low. In the long-run, the economy can converge towards the low
steady state h¯ such that a majority of the population votes for a high Welfare State. The
economy can remain in this situation as long as expectations are stable. However, if a
generation expects that a low tax rate will be chosen at the next period, then only a
few agents decide not educate themselves, and the educated population actually gets the
majority. Consequently, the crisis of the Welfare State occurs only if agents expect that it
will do. Using this analysis, countries of ﬁgure 1 can diﬀer in the long-run only because of
diﬀerent expectations. Compared to the ﬁrst case, here the expectations aﬀect the steady
state of the economy.
Case 4: hb > h > h¯ > ha
Figure 7 illustrates that case, which occurs as long as the gap between ha and hb
is high, i.e. if the share of the educated population depends more on the redistributive
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policies than on the elasticity of wages with respect to the stock of knowledge. Moreover,
the technology of the accumulation of the knowledge capital is not very eﬃcient because
the highest steady state (h) is smaller than hb. In this speciﬁc context the economy can
switch from one steady state to the other according to the beliefs of agents about the size
of the Welfare State. For example, let us assume that h0 is suﬃciently small for agents
to expect a large Welfare State to be adopted at period 0. If this belief endures for every
following generation, knowledge capital will converge towards h¯ which is associated with
a large social security system. But, once at steady state, if the beliefs of agents change
and if young agents expect that the Welfare State will be less generous, then a large part
of the population decides to educate itself and τ will actually be chosen. If this belief
endures, the economy will converge towards h with a less redistributive Welfare State.
In the same way, once the economy reaches this new steady state, if some generations of
agents believe that a large welfare state will be chosen, the economy will come back to
the steady state h¯.
For the moment, the existence of the Welfare State is too recent to invalidate or to
conﬁrm the plausibility of such a case. So, it might be read as a theoretical result about
the cycles in a political economy model with indeterminacy.
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4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have tried to provide some explanations about the diﬀerences observed
in the dynamics of the size of the Welfare States of developed countries (ﬁgure 1)14. We
notably explain why some countries keep a high level of public spending, whereas others
have begun to reduce the ﬁscal burden of their Government. Our main argument is that
the demand for redistribution can be engine of the dynamics of the Welfare Sate. It implies
that the structure of the population, which inﬂuences the demand for redistribution, plays
a main role to study the previous empirical facts. We have shown that some scenarii can
be considered. In case 1, the beliefs of agents can change the period from which the size
of public spending decreases. In case 2, the steady state value of the knowledge capital is
too small for educated agents get the majority. Then, a wide Welfare State is chosen at
all periods. In case 3, the beliefs of agents can change both the dynamics and the steady
state of the economy. Indeed, an economy keeps a wide tax rate as long as agents expect
that such a situation will remain the same at the next period. However, once a generation
expect that a change will occur, then the economy adopts a low Welfare State. In case 4,
we show that that there can appear cycles in the size of public spending.
This paper emphasizes that the dynamics of the size of a Government does not only
depend on objective factors such as the wage inequality ratio,... but that it also depends
on subjective factors such as the beliefs of agents. We have shown that it can have a
signiﬁcant impact on the result of the voting procedure. It also proves the importance of
the public debate and of the diﬀusion of a belief. Some agents, whose educational costs
are low, have an incentive to convince every others that the Welfare State will be less
generous at the next period, for it actually to be the case. This role played by subjective
factors has already been studied in a few papers. In Alesina and Angeletos (2005), the
beliefs of agents about the fairness of the economic system determines the demand for
redistribution. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2002) also use the indeterminacy property in a
cultural transmission model in which agents vote on the size of the Welfare State. In this
model, there are two kinds of agents: those who like a wide Welfare State, and those who
dislike it. Parents prefer that their children have the same preferences as they, and parents
have to make an eﬀort for this is the case. Parents also take into account the result of the
vote which will occur when their children will be in the working population. Bisin and
Verdier (2000, 2002) show that there can be indeterminacy in the initial periods, but that,
14Our main objective was not to explain the initial diﬀerences in the level of taxes which has already
been widely studied in the literature.
22
in the long-run, an economy converges either towards a low Welfare State, or towards a
high Welfare State.
Finally, this paper has only considered one aspect of the Welfare State: the vertical
redistribution. Nevertheless, it also provides insurance against life risks, public spending
in infrastructure,.... Our story is only one way to consider the role of the Welfare State
and its dynamics. These elements should be considered to tell the complete story of the
dynamics of Welfare States.
5 APPENDIX
This appendix provides the proof of lemma 2.1.
(i) The RHS is a strictly increasing function of θ˜t by assumption (see assumption 1).
There only remains to proove that the LHS is a decreasing function of θ˜t.
Diﬀerentiating the ratio of the LHS of equation (17), we obtain an expression of the
following form:
∂we
∂θ˜
(1− τa)(wu(1− τa) + τaw¯)− ∂wu
∂θ˜
(1− τa)(we(1− τa) + τaw¯) + τa(1− τa)(wu − we)∂w¯
∂θ˜[
wu(h, θ˜)(1− τa) + τaw¯(h, θ˜)
]2
Using equations (14) and (15) this expression becomes:
(1− τa)wu ∂we
∂θ˜
− ∂wu
∂θ˜
(1− τa)(we(1− τa) + τaw¯)[
wu(h, θ˜)(1− τa) + τaw¯(h, θ˜)
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+τa(1− τa)(wu − we)[f(θ˜)(we − wu) + (1− F (θ˜))∂wu
∂θ˜
][
wu(h, θ˜)(1− τa) + τaw¯(h, θ˜)
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(ii) The LHS is a strictly decreasing function of τat .
Diﬀerentiating the ratio of the LHS of equation (17) with respect to ht, we obtain an
expression of the following form:
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∂we
∂h
(1− τa)(wu(1− τa) + τaw¯)− ∂wu
∂h
(1− τa)(we(1− τa) + τaw¯) + ∂w¯
∂h
τa(1− τa)(wu − we)[
wu(h, θ˜)(1− τa) + τaw¯(h, θ˜)
]2
Using equations (14) we obtain:
(1− τa) (∂we
∂h
wu − ∂wu
∂h
we
)[
wu(h, θ˜)(1− τa) + τaw¯(h, θ˜)
]2 > 0
The numerator is positive under assumption 2 and if τa < 1. As we assume that τ
cannot be equal to 1 then this condition is satisﬁed.
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